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CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
WITHDRAWAL RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF 
TREATIES 
CURTIS A. BRADLEY* AND MITU GULATI** 
INTRODUCTION 
The conventional wisdom among international law scholars is that, 
once a rule of customary international law (“CIL”) becomes established, 
nations never have the unilateral right to withdraw from it. Instead, if they 
want to act in a way that is contrary to the rule, they must either violate it 
and hope that other nations acquiesce in the violation, or they must 
persuade other nations to enter into a treaty that overrides the CIL rule. In 
Withdrawing from International Custom, we termed this conventional 
wisdom the “Mandatory View” of CIL.1 
As we explained in Withdrawing, the Mandatory View of CIL can be 
contrasted with the withdrawal rights that frequently exist under treaties. 
When nations expressly negotiate the creation of treaty obligations, they 
often include within the treaty a right of withdrawal, sometimes 
conditioned upon a period of notice. Even when they do not make such an 
agreement expressly, the subject matter of the treaty will sometimes itself 
suggest an implicit right of withdrawal. Moreover, even when there is no 
general right of withdrawal from a treaty, nations typically will have some 
right of withdrawal for situations in which there has been a fundamental 
change of circumstances. Finally, nations often have the ability to remain a 
party to a treaty while avoiding the application of particular provisions 
within the treaty through the use of reservations or the invocation of 
derogation clauses.2 
This dichotomy between no exit rights under CIL and frequent and 
variegated exit rights under treaties is puzzling, for several reasons. 
Treaties and CIL are the two major sources of international law, and their 
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 1. See Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 
202, 205 (2010). 
 2. For discussion of these various exit options under treaties, see id. at 270-71. 
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substantive content frequently overlaps. Moreover, it is in many ways more 
difficult to create international law through treaty than through custom, 
since a treaty requires an express act of ratification. As a result, one might 
expect that, if anything, it would be more difficult to exit from treaties than 
from CIL, rather than the opposite. 
We searched in the literature and found almost no explanation for the 
Mandatory View, and what little we did find was brief and conclusory. We 
attempted to trace the intellectual roots of the Mandatory View, but this 
produced only additional puzzles. We found, for example, that a number of 
the classic international law commentators of the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries thought that nations could unilaterally exit from at least some CIL 
rules.3 In addition, we found that the intellectual shift to the Mandatory 
View began to take place in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries and may have been part of an effort to ensure that “uncivilized” 
nations would be bound to the CIL worked out by a handful of powerful 
Western countries, something that raises questions about the normative 
underpinnings of the Mandatory View. Furthermore, we found that the one 
exception under the Mandatory View to the ban on unilateral exit—the so-
called “persistent objector doctrine”—is a modern creation that did not 
become established until well after World War II and appears to have been 
in part a response to continuing uncertainties about how the Mandatory 
View would operate in practice. 
After reviewing this history, we considered the Mandatory View from 
the perspective of institutional design. Because there was so little 
theoretical defense of the Mandatory View in the literature, we were 
compelled to speculate about what might be the best arguments in favor of 
that View. To gain traction on this issue, we drew from theoretical work 
that has been done concerning exit rights in the areas of contract law, 
constitutional design, and voting rights. We found that, although there are 
arguments that can be made to defend the Mandatory View, these 
arguments at best apply to only a subset of CIL, most notably where CIL is 
designed to address externality or agency problems. We also found that 
allowing exit rights under CIL could enhance the usefulness of CIL, by 
 
 3. See id. at 215. For a similar account of this history, see William S. Dodge, Customary 
International Law in US Courts: Origins of the Later-in-Time Rule, in MAKING TRANSNATIONAL LAW 
WORK IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DETLEV VAGTS 531-59 (Pieter H.F. Bekker, 
Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel eds., forthcoming 2010). We did not make any claim in Withdrawing 
that this history should control the present, and any such claim would need to resolve a number of 
difficult “translation” problems in light of changes in international law and the international system. 
Our claim about the history was “simply that it shows that the Mandatory View is not the only possible 
approach to CIL and that an international legal system could potentially operate despite the allowance 
of some CIL withdrawal rights.” Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 225-26. 
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making it more transparent and efficient, and by encouraging broader 
experimentation. We concluded with some thoughts about how a typology 
might be developed to allow for variability in exit rights. 
In this symposium issue of the Duke Journal of Comparative and 
International Law, a number of leading scholars engage with our project. 
Some of these scholars offer critiques of the analysis in Withdrawing, while 
others raise practical questions about how our ideas might be implemented. 
At minimum, this symposium fills a gap in the literature in terms of setting 
forth a sustained assessment of the Mandatory View. We are hopeful that it 
will also serve as a platform for additional work concerning withdrawal 
rights under CIL. Regardless, we owe an immense debt to the scholars who 
took part in the symposium, both for their willingness to consider our ideas 
and for their insightful comments.4 
In this essay, we seek to advance the analysis set forth in Withdrawing 
by addressing four topics: the current state of CIL; the proper way to 
conceive of CIL and its relationship to treaties; how a shift away from the 
Mandatory View might occur in practice; and whether a shift to a Default 
View would make a meaningful difference in state practice. Most of the 
criticisms directed at Withdrawing are encompassed within these topics. 
We conclude the essay with some observations about additional research 
that might be useful. 
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CIL 
In this Part, we briefly review the current state of CIL, from the 
perspective of both theory and practice. If CIL is currently operating well 
along these dimensions, this should increase the burden on those arguing 
for a change in the way that CIL is conceived. On the other hand, if CIL is 
not operating well along these dimensions, some of the objections to a new 
conception of CIL—such as concerns about creating uncertainty and 
inefficiencies—are reduced.5 
A. CIL in Theory 
 Far from being well understood and accepted, the theory of CIL 
today is riddled with uncertainty. While commentators often recite that CIL 
is based on some combination of state practice and opinio juris, even a 
 
 4. We are also grateful to Brad Clark, Eugene Kontorovich, John McGinnis, Francesco Parisi, 
Andreas Paulus, and Amanda Perreau-Saussine, all of whom made valuable contributions to the in-
person symposium held at Duke in January 2010 but did not contribute papers to this written 
symposium. 
 5. Cf. Rachel Brewster, Withdrawing from Custom through Treaty: Choosing Between Default 
Rules, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 47, 54 (2010). 
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gentle probing of this definition reveals fundamental puzzles and debates. It 
is not clear, for example, what counts as state practice. Should a nation’s 
treaty practice count? Can evidence of opinio juris, such as positions taken 
in international institutions, also constitute state practice? How much state 
practice must there be, and for how long? Similar questions abound for 
opinio juris. For example, to what extent do the views expressed by a state 
with respect to international resolutions or treaty norms count as evidence 
of opinio juris for CIL? To what extent can opinio juris be inferred from 
practice? More fundamentally, if CIL requires that nations believe that they 
are legally obligated, how does that belief arise in the first place? There is 
no settled answer to any of these (and numerous other) questions about 
CIL.6 
Many of these uncertainties are longstanding, but they are now more 
pressing because the proliferation of multilateral treaties has raised new 
questions about the need for CIL as a distinct source of international law. 
Most of the major issue areas that were historically regulated by CIL are 
now regulated, to one degree or another, by treaties. Treaties have a variety 
of attractions as compared with CIL, in that they provide more direct 
evidence of state preferences (since they are the product of express 
negotiation), they can provide for greater specificity (since they are 
typically in writing), and they can establish institutional mechanisms to 
promote monitoring, adjudication, and enforcement of the norms. 
Moreover, the development of the United Nations system and other 
international institutions after World War II, along with developments in 
travel and communications, have greatly facilitated the development of 
international law in this form. The possible result, as Joel Trachtman notes, 
is the “increasing marginalization of custom.”7 
There is an even more fundamental uncertainty surrounding CIL, 
which concerns its connection to state consent. Although many 
international law commentators dismiss consent as the touchstone for the 
legitimacy of international law, there is nothing approaching agreement on 
any other theory. Moreover, the explanation that is often given for why 
consent is not a requirement is that current international law doctrine, 
especially doctrine relating to CIL, is difficult to reconcile with such a 
requirement.8 But this is just circular reasoning: international law does not 
require consent because it does not require consent. The inclusion of the 
 
 6. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 210-11. 
 7. Joel P. Trachtman, Persistent Objectors, Cooperation, and the Utility of Customary 
International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 221, 232 (2010). 
 8. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 213-14. 
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persistent objector doctrine in the standard contemporary account of CIL 
only confuses matters further, since most explanations of the doctrine 
ground it in the need for state consent.9 If that is true, however, it is not 
clear why CIL doctrine categorically rules out the possibility of a 
subsequent objector doctrine. 
Not surprisingly, these theoretical uncertatainties have made CIL ripe 
for critics. Some have questioned whether CIL operates as law.10 Others 
have questioned its usefulness and legitimacy.11 Still others have 
questioned its normative attractiveness—from the perspective, for example, 
of efficiency,12 or democratic accountability.13 As David Bederman notes, 
this is a “time when customary international law is coming under attack by 
both extreme positivists (who suggest that its processes are illegitimate and 
non-transparent) and by those of a naturalist bent (who regard it as merely 
pandering to state interests).”14 This growing skepticism has in turn 
prompted one scholar to attempt to “save” CIL,15 although most defenders 
of CIL have responded by simply ignoring the critiques. 
B. CIL in Practice 
It is more difficult to ascertain the state of CIL in practice, but there 
are a variety of reasons to believe that it is less than ideal. As Paul Stephan 
discusses, although international law commentators frequently write as if 
there were a single body of CIL, this does not describe actual practice.16 
There is instead an ever growing cacophony of claims about the content of 
CIL, with no identifiable hierarchy among these voices. The “CIL” invoked 
 
 9. See id. at 233; see also Patrick Dumberry, The Last Citadel! Can a State Claim the Status of 
Persistent Objector to Prevent the Application of a Rule of Customary International Law in Investor-
State Arbitration?, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 379, 389-391 (2010). 
 10. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 23-43 
(2005). 
 11. See, e.g., J. Patrick Kelly, The Twilight of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 
449 (2000). 
 12. See, e.g., Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law, 48 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 859, 889-94 (2006). 
 13. See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Should International Law Be Part of Our Law?, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1175 (2007). 
 14. David J. Bederman, Acquiescence, Objection and the Death of Customary International Law, 
21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 31, 43 (2010); see also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary 
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 116, 117 (2005) (noting that “CIL is under attack from all 
sides” and that “virtually everyone agrees that the theory and doctrine of CIL is a mess”); George 
Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541, 541 
(2005) (“[CIL] is under attack as behaviorally epiphenomenal and doctrinally incoherent.”). 
 15. See generally Guzman, supra note 14. 
 16. See Paul B. Stephan, Disaggregating Customary International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 191 (2010). 
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by international institutions differs as between these institutions, and it also 
differs from the “CIL” invoked by NGOs, domestic courts, executive 
spokespersons, and other actors. There is consequently a danger that CIL is 
simply becoming, to use Sam Estreicher’s term, a form of “law-speak.”17 
The nature of the claims about CIL also appear to have fundamentally 
changed in recent years. When actors make claims about CIL, they often 
fail to tie the claims to empirical assessments of state practice. Instead, 
these actors cite treaties, the resolutions of international bodies, claims by 
scholars, or normative arguments. When state practice is cited, the citations 
are often selective and partial. Moreover, when state practice contradicts a 
purported CIL norm (as it frequently does for issues relating to human 
rights and the use of force, for example), the contrary practice is dismissed 
as mere violations of the norm. In some instances, the label “CIL” is simply 
used to avoid international or domestic restrictions that are associated with 
treaties. 
CIL is also sufficiently vague, and the mechanisms of its enforcement 
are sufficiently limited, that nations almost certainly “exit” from it 
regularly without saying so. Instead of invoking a formal withdrawal right, 
nations dissemble about the content of CIL or attempt to conceal their 
violations.18 The end result is uncertainty and unpredictability in the 
content of CIL, and a diminishment of its legitimacy.19 Moreover, as we 
discussed in Withdrawing, these de facto exit rights vary substantially 
depending on a nation’s power and resources, thereby exacerbating 
normative concerns that already exist about the structure of CIL.20 These 
concerns include, among other things, the possibility that the Mandatory 
View of CIL was developed as part of an effort to maintain colonial 
domination.21 
Some commentators have suggested that all would be well if the 
system limited itself to “old” rather than “new” CIL.22 Old CIL is 
developed inductively from widespread and longstanding patterns of state 
 
 17. See Samuel Estreicher, A Post-Formation Right of Withdrawal from Customary Interntaional 
Law?: Some Cautionary Notes, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 57, 59 (2010); see also Kelly, supra note 
11, at 453 (“The ‘custom-speak’ used in international legal discourse is an indeterminate, normative 
discourse that varies from writer to writer and state to state.”). 
 18. Hans Morgenthau famously described this problem with CIL more than sixty years ago. See 
HANS J. MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 214 (1948). 
 19. See C.L. Lim & Olufemi Elias, Withdrawing from Custom and the Paradox of Consensualism 
in International Law, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 143 (2010). 
 20. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 261-62. 
 21. See id. at 230. 
 22. See Estreicher, supra note 17, at 62; Edward T. Swaine, Bespoke Custom, 21 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 207 (2010). 
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behavior. New CIL, by contrast, is more deductive and is characterized by 
reliance on international resolutions, treaties, scholarly opinion, and similar 
materials to establish the content of CIL, and by the influence of non-state 
actors such as NGOs.23 
This nostalgia for the old CIL highlights the fact that the current CIL 
system has not succeeded in generating consensus. In any event, the 
nostalgia is unrealistic because international and domestic adjudicators 
routinely rely on (and create) new CIL materials, and there is no reason to 
believe that this practice will change.24 Moreover, the new CIL has 
significant support in both the NGO community and the legal academy 
because (among other things), it gives those constituencies a greater voice 
in CIL creation.25 The nostalgia for the old CIL is also inattentive to 
history. As discussed in Withdrawing, CIL was historically dictated by a 
handful of Western powers, and restrictions on exit from the old CIL were 
likely adopted as a way for the Western powers to impose their rules on the 
new entrants to the system.26 
The old CIL is also now less relevant in light of the rise of treaties, 
and it is structurally ill suited for addressing many contemporary problems. 
Indeed, as nations have sought to address the leading international 
problems of the twenty-first century, such as terrorism, the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, global warning, and international financial regulation, 
they have looked to treaties and written soft law instruments rather than 
trying to create old-style CIL. By contrast, the new CIL gives greater voice 
to a wider set of interests,27 and it has the potential to address a larger set of 
problems than the old CIL.28 Our objection in Withdrawing was not to the 
new CIL, but rather to the failure to adapt exit rights to the new system. 
 
 23. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 838-42 (1997); Anthea E. 
Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 
AM. J. INT’L L. 757, 759 (2006). 
 24. See, e.g., Roozbeh (Rudy) B. Baker, Customary International Law in the 21st Century: Old 
Challenges and New Debates, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 173 (2010). 
 25. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 775 (noting the increased importance of non-state actors such as 
NGOs in CIL creation). 
 26. Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understanding the Resemblance Between Modern 
and Traditional Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 639, 667 (2000) (arguing that the old 
CIL, like the new CIL, was not grounded heavily in state practice or consent). 
 27. See Roberts, supra note 23, at 768. 
 28. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 529, 546-47 
(1993). At the same time, the new CIL may entail the need for additional caution with respect to 
domestic implementation. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 23; McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13. 
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III. PROPER CONCEPTION OF CIL 
In Withdrawing, our argument for a Default View of CIL drew in part 
on an analogy to withdrawal rights under treaties. Some of our respondents 
have challenged this analogy on the ground that CIL and treaties are 
conceptually different in ways that might be relevant to withdrawal rights. 
In particular, these commentators have put forward three conceptions of 
CIL that might distinguish it from treaties: CIL as a safety net, CIL as akin 
to mandatory domestic public law, and CIL as a social contract. 
As we will explain, while the advocates of these conceptions purport 
to be defending the status quo, none of the conceptions fits with current 
understandings of the structure and content of CIL. Nor have the advocates 
of these conceptions explained why the CIL system should be changed so 
that it would operate in the way that they envision. 
A. CIL as Safety Net 
One argument for distinguishing CIL from treaties is to conceive of 
CIL as a safety net that ensures that states remain bound by certain basic 
rules of international law regardless of whether they stay out of, or 
withdraw from, treaties. Thus, for example, Anthea Roberts contends that 
the reason that CIL does not allow for a right of withdrawal is that it “sets 
the ground rules for the international system by imposing a minimum core 
of binding obligations on all states.”29 She also posits that “[t]reaties may 
well commonly permit exit precisely because custom, which does not allow 
for withdrawal, exists to protect key interests.”30 
This conception is simply asserted, and it differs in a number of 
respects from standard modern accounts of CIL. Most accounts of 
international law view treaties and CIL as separate and equal “sources” that 
can be drawn from for various purposes, including international 
adjudication and arbitration.31 Under this standard account, sometimes CIL 
will exist in the absence of a treaty, sometimes treaties will exist in the 
absence of relevant CIL, and sometimes the two will overlap. Moreover, 
treaties will sometimes codify CIL, and at other times treaties will 
 
 29. Anthea Roberts, Who Killed Article 38(1)(b)? A Reply to Bradley and Gulati, 21 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 173, 173 (2010). 
 30. Id. at 176. For a similar suggestion, see Dino Kritsiotis, On the Possibilities of and for 
Persistent Objection, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 121, 121 (2010). 
 31. See, e.g., J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 57-62 (6th ed. 1963) (discussing treaties and 
custom as separate sources of international law); 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (Robert 
Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996) (describing treaties and custom as “the principal and 
regular sources of international law”); I.A. SHEARER, STARKE’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 27-28 (11th ed. 
1994) (listing custom and treaties among the sources of international law). 
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influence the content of CIL. This landscape is much more complicated and 
nuanced than suggested by the safety net conception. 
The structure of modern CIL formation, which advocates of the safety 
conception have not challenged, also seems inconsistent with this 
conception. The weight of commentary appears to accept a persistent 
objector doctrine, but that doctrine would make no sense if CIL is a safety 
net that no state should be able to exempt itself from. In addition, it is 
accepted that nations may eliminate CIL obligations as between themselves 
by entering into a treaty to that effect, but it is not clear why this would 
make sense if CIL were a minimum core that is needed in order for the 
international society to operate. 
The foregoing inconsistency becomes more evident if one inquires 
into the possible rationale behind the safety net. Typically, legal safety 
nets, particularly those that provide for minimal standards in agreements, 
are designed to protect weaker parties against opportunistic overreaching 
by their stronger counterparts.32 As we have explained, however, the 
current system of CIL actually seems structured in a way that favors 
stronger rather than weaker countries, and the Mandatory View may have 
been adopted for precisely that purpose.33 In any event, the safety net 
rationale is undermined by the allowance under the Mandatory View of 
treaty overrides, a mechanism through which strong nations can bypass the 
purported CIL safety net by entering into individual treaties with weaker 
countries. These treaty override situations are where a safety net would be 
most warranted because the strong nation can take advantage of factors 
such as bargaining leverage, the ability to coerce leaders of the weaker 
nation, superior information, and greater legal sophistication, and yet we do 
not find any protection for the weaker country in this situation under the 
prevailing conception of CIL. 
Finally, the safety net conception suggests a non-robust role for CIL, 
whereby it would regulate only certain minimum standards considered 
essential for the functioning of the international system. In Withdrawing, 
we acknowledged that it might be sensible for a core “constitutional law” 
of the international system to be treated as mandatory,34 but this core is 
typically considered to be only a small portion of modern CIL. In fact, as 
 
 32. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Embracing Unconscionability’s Safety Net Function, 58 ALASKA L. 
REV. 73, 77-90 (2006). 
 33. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 230. 
 34. See id. at 274. 
BRADLEY_GULATI_FMT3.DOC 1/7/2011  1:31:36 PM 
10 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 21:30 
Louis Henkin suggested, it might not even be proper to call it CIL.35 It is 
unlikely that advocates of this safety net idea are willing to accept the non-
robust role for CIL that it implies. Indeed, many modern arguments about 
the content of CIL (such as arguments about a CIL of human rights) depend 
on it operating in a manner that is broader and more comprehensive than 
treaties—in effect, the opposite of a safety net. 
B. Analogy to Mandatory Domestic Public Law 
Another way that CIL might be distinguished from treaties is to 
analogize to the distinction in domestic law between mandatory public law 
and contract law. The argument might go as follows: Treaties are voluntary 
and contractual, akin to contracts in a domestic legal system. CIL, by 
contrast, is more akin to mandatory domestic public law, such as criminal 
law. Although individuals can move in and out of contractual relationships, 
we would not expect them to be able to withdraw from the rules of 
mandatory domestic public law.36 Thus, for example, individuals cannot 
unilaterally or through private contract opt out of domestic law prohibitions 
on murder, or prostitution, or tax liability. Thus, the argument goes, nations 
should not be able to opt out of CIL rules. 
There are a number of problems with this analogy. Mandatory 
domestic public law emanates from a central sovereign that has authority to 
act on behalf of the community being regulated, whereas CIL is not 
developed in that way. Indeed, to the extent there have been modest 
developments towards having a central sovereign in the international 
community, they have all been accomplished by treaty, not through CIL, 
and yet withdrawal rights are still common in the treaty area. 
The structure of CIL, as it is commonly described today, is also 
inconsistent with the analogy to mandatory domestic public law. For 
example, it is well accepted that nations can contract out of rules of CIL, as 
between themselves, by entering into treaties. Such contractual flexibility is 
not available, however, for mandatory domestic public law, because this 
law reflects a decision that private arrangements will undermine the public 
interest. In addition, most accounts of modern CIL assume that nations 
have a right to opt out of it before it develops by being a persistent 
objector. Again, mandatory domestic public law does not work in that 
fashion. 
 
 35. See LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 32 (1995) (“Such inter-state 
constitutional law is not ‘customary law’ in any meaningful sense relevant to an appreciation and 
understanding of the ‘sources’ of international law today.”). 
 36. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 178. 
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Nor does the substance of CIL seem to match up with a mandatory 
domestic public law conception. Mandatory domestic public law covers 
particular subject areas, such as criminal law, and leaves many other issues 
to private ordering. As currently conceived, however, CIL covers all issues 
of potential inter-state interactions. Moreover, whereas criminal law is the 
paradigm example of mandatory domestic public law, it is rare for a breach 
of CIL to implicate international criminal responsibility. Instead, breaches 
almost always trigger (at most) a right to a private civil remedy, similar to a 
breach of contract remedy in a domestic legal system, and international 
adjudication of such claims is typically consensual. Furthermore, the 
substance of CIL today often overlaps with treaties that contain withdrawal 
clauses, and these clauses provide at least some evidence that nations do 
not view the subject matter of these treaties as analogous to mandatory 
domestic public law. 
If anything, treaty law today looks much more analogous to domestic 
public law than to CIL. As we explained in Withdrawing, CIL has great 
difficulty regulating problems for which there are significant externalities 
or free rider problems, such as global warming.37 As a result, international 
public regulation of such topics is generally accomplished either by treaty, 
or not at all. Nevertheless, we often find withdrawal clauses even in the 
most foundational public law treaties, such as in the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. 
There is a small body of international law, which is sometimes 
described as a sub-category of CIL, for which the analogy to mandatory 
domestic public law seems like a closer fit. It is the body of law known as 
jus cogens, or “peremptory norms.” For the small number of international 
law norms that are said to fall into this category, such as the prohibition on 
genocide, nations are not allowed to contract out of them, even between 
themselves, and there is no right of persistent objection.38 Moreover, 
international criminal law has been centered around these norms. As we 
suggested in Withdrawing, therefore, jus cogens norms are probably a 
prime candidate for the Mandatory View.39 The majority of CIL rules, 
however, do not fall within this category. 
C. CIL as Social Contract 
A third conception of CIL that might distinguish it from treaties is 
more philosophical, although it overlaps with the mandatory public law 
 
 37. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 264. 
 38. See Mark W. Janis, The Nature of Jus Cogens, 3 CONN. J. INT’L L. 359, 359 (1988). 
 39. See id. 
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analogy discussed above. The idea is that whereas treaties stem from 
individual national consent, CIL represents a more communitarian social 
contract. Christiana Ochoa argues, for example, that “[b]y participating in 
CIL formation, each state places itself and its otherwise free exercise of 
sovereign will under the direction of the collective will.”40 
Social contract theory was historically developed to explain the 
authority exercised by sovereign governments over individuals. The most 
obvious problem with transposing this theory to the international setting is 
that there is no international sovereign. Ochoa refers to the “collective 
will,” but this is a fiction. Moreover, the collective in this case includes 
authoritarian, repressive regimes, and there is no reason to think that 
democracies like the United States have given themselves over to the will 
of such regimes, or that it would be normatively desirable for them to do 
so. 
In any event, to say that there is an implied social contract does not 
tell us the content of this contract. In particular, it does not explain why the 
implicit social contract is to disallow any exit from CIL rules. Classic 
international law commentators like Vattel subscribed to the social contract 
theory of the state, even though they also thought nations could sometimes 
withdraw from rules of CIL.41 Ultimately, this claim of a social contract 
boils down to a normative claim that it would be undesirable to allow any 
exit rights, but those who have made the social contract claim have not 
explained why disallowing opt out rights would be normatively desirable. 
Some of our respondents have suggested that a disallowance of 
unilateral withdrawal follows from principles of symmetry.42 That is, they 
argue that there should be a presumption that rules for terminating law 
should mirror the rules for creating law.43 Applying that presumption to 
CIL, they contend that because CIL is formed only through the practices 
and beliefs of many nations, a single nation should not have the right to 
 
 40. Christiana Ochoa, Disintegrating Customary International Law: Reactions to Withdrawing 
from International Custom, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 157, 159 (2010); see also Roberts, supra note 
29, at 178 (suggesting analogy between CIL and social contract theory). 
       41. See, e.g., Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 922 (1991) (“Vattel 
explained the creation of the state as the product of an act of association, or social contract . . . .”); 
Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of the International Law of Personal 
Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 403 n.109 (1995) (“Vattel saw the state as 
primarily an act of association or social contract.”); see also Matthew Lister, The Legitimating Role of 
Consent in International Law (July 8, 2010), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/academics/ 
institutes/ilp/intl_law_papers/Lister_LegitimatingRoleofConsent.pdf (defending withdrawal rights from 
the perspective of social contract theory). 
 42. See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 167-71. Roberts, supra note 29, at 188. 
 43. See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 169-70 (relying on John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, 
Symmetric Entrenchment: A Constitutional and Normative Theory, 89 VA. L. REV. 418 (2003)). 
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unilaterally withdraw from it. The issue, however, is not whether an 
individual nation should have the unilateral ability to terminate a rule of 
CIL. Rather, the issue is whether a nation should in some instances have 
the unilateral right to withdraw from the rule. Such a right would not 
offend any presumption of symmetry: just as under the persistent objector 
doctrine a nation can affirmatively opt out of a CIL rule before it forms, it 
would now have the ability to object and remove itself from the CIL rule 
after it is created. Similarly, for multilateral treaties, the issue is not 
whether an individual nation can terminate the treaty. Rather, the issue is 
whether, just as the nation can decide whether or not to join the treaty, it 
can decide later to remove itself from the treaty. 
Finally, some of the respondents have argued that, even if CIL were 
more analogous to a private contract than to a social contract, the analogy 
would not support the allowance of exit rights because parties to a private 
contract never have the legal right to withdraw from the contract 
unilaterally without committing a breach.44 In fact, many contractual 
relationships may be terminated unilaterally, at least with notice. Thus, for 
example, only “reasonable notification” is required for unilateral 
termination of an indefinite-duration commercial contract.45 Similarly, 
individual employees typically have the right to withdraw unilaterally from 
an indefinite-duration employment contract (otherwise they would in effect 
be indentured servants). It is in fact difficult to think of any indefinite-
duration contractual relationships that do not allow for unilateral 
withdrawal, and contract law in fact generally forbids, as a matter of public 
policy, obligations of indefinite duration. Even marriage, which can be 
viewed as a relational contract that is expected to last for the life of the 
parties, allows (under modern laws) for unilateral withdrawal through 
divorce. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF A DEFAULT VIEW 
In Withdrawing, we focused on the historical and functional case for 
allowing withdrawal rights and did not address issues of implementation. 
Understandably, therefore, a number of our respondents have raised 
questions about how the international system might move towards a 
Default View. This is a topic that deserves more consideration than we can 
give it here, but we nevertheless sketch out some preliminary thoughts in 
 
 44. See Ochoa, supra note 40, at 160-61; see also Trachtman, supra note 7, at 221 (suggesting that 
international law is analogous to domestic contract law and that this analogy supports the Mandatory 
View). 
 45. See U.C.C., § 2-309(3) (1977).  
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Section A. We then address specific concerns about implementation of 
withdrawal rights in Sections B and C. 
A. Developing Secondary Rules for CIL 
Ultimately, the implementation questions raised by our respondents 
concern how the secondary rules of CIL develop and change. There is little 
guidance on this issue in the CIL literature. Most literature on CIL appears 
to assume that the secondary rules of CIL creation and alteration have 
always been the way that they are now. We know from the historical 
analysis in Withdrawing, however, that that is not the case with respect to 
elements of the Mandatory View, including the persistent objector doctrine. 
More dramatically, the Mandatory View itself appears to have been a 
change from an earlier view under which there were exit rights for at least 
some rules of CIL. The secondary rules of CIL in fact continue to change—
for example, with the rise of the “new CIL,” as discussed above in Part I. 
Despite the fact that there have been these changes, there does not appear 
to be any clear understanding of, or even significant theorizing about, how 
this process of change works. 
If we look specifically at the persistent objector doctrine, the 
secondary rule whose evolution we know the most about, it appears to owe 
both its origins and development largely to a discourse in academic 
treatises and journal articles (ironically, many of which were quite critical 
of the idea).46 Roughly fifty years after the doctrine was first articulated by 
Humphrey Waldock, the evidence of state practice or opinio juris in 
support of the doctrine is still modest.47 Nevertheless, it is now a well 
accepted doctrine. This example might suggest that secondary rules of CIL 
can be created via academic discourse, independent of any state practice or 
opinion. If so, then Withdrawing and the responsive commentary in this 
volume might themselves be part of the implementation process. 
We should be clear that this technique of CIL creation is not what we 
are proposing. Even if academic opinion has had a significant influence on 
changes in the secondary rules of CIL, this influence raises normative 
considerations relating to accountability and representativeness.48 It also 
creates a danger of undermining CIL by further divorcing it from the way 
in which the international system actually operates. That said, we do 
believe that academic debate can play a legitimate role in the process of 
 
 46. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 235-39. 
 47. See, e.g., Patrick Dumberrry, Incoherent and Ineffective: The Concept of the Persistent 
Objector Doctrine Revisited, 59 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 779 (2010). 
 48. See McGinnis & Somin, supra note 13, at 1217-18. 
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secondary rule creation. Asking whether existing legal rules operate 
effectively and examining how they might be improved are standard topics 
in academic discourse, and this discourse can help develop the arguments 
for and against various approaches. 
Increased academic attention to the topic can in turn lead to more 
governmental discussion and ultimately a shift in state practice and opinio 
juris. One potential vehicle for such a shift would be a codification project, 
under the auspices of an organization such as the International Law 
Commission. This is what happened with the secondary rules governing 
treaties. Efforts to achieve a codification of the rules began with an 
academic drafting project—the 1935 Harvard Law School research project 
on international law—which produced an extensive draft convention on the 
law of treaties and accompanying commentary.49 Subsequently, starting in 
1949, the International Law Commission engaged in a twenty-year drafting 
process that resulted in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A 
number of leading international law scholars served as the rapporteurs in 
this drafting effort, and academics were heavily engaged in debating the 
proper contours of the proposed treaty. Ultimately, nations were able to 
agree on a wide-ranging treaty that addresses numerous issues relating to 
the formation, interpretation, and termination of treaties.50 Over 110 nations 
are now parties to the Vienna Convention, and even the nations that have 
not ratified it (such as the United States) accept much of it as reflecting 
binding CIL. 
This is just one possible avenue for change. A different model would 
be something like the Princeton Project on Universal Jurisdiction, in which 
a group of scholars and jurists from around the world composed a set of 
guidelines for the exercise of the CIL principle of universal jurisdiction.51 
Alternatively, instead of being part of a comprehensive law reform or 
codification package, change could also arise on an ad hoc basis stemming 
from state positions on particular issues of CIL. It bears repeating that the 
process for evolution and change in the secondary rules of CIL remains 
under-studied. If all that our article does is to prompt more attention to this 
 
 49. See Harvard Research in Int’l Law, Draft Convention on Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 
653 (Supp. 1935); see also SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW OF TREATIES 31-32 (1970) (“[I]t would not be 
an exaggeration to state that the Harvard draft constitutes the point of departure for all modern research 
into the law of treaties, including the work of the International Law Commission.”). 
 50. The Vienna Convention reflects both codification of preexisting CIL and progressive 
development of new principles. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 12-13 (2d ed. 1984). Many of the secondary rules set forth in the Vienna Convention serve as 
defaults—that is, they apply unless altered by express agreement. 
 51. See PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PROGRAM IN LAW AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, http:// 
lapa.princeton.edu/publications.php (last visited October 3, 2010), for a description of this project. 
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issue, that itself will be a benefit. What we do know is that the secondary 
rules of CIL do and can change, and that academic discussion and debate 
can play a role in such change. Ultimately, change will likely depend on 
whether the relevant actors in the system become persuaded that 
modifications to CIL exit rights are beneficial. That issue is of course what 
much of the analysis in Withdrawing was focused on. 
B. Transition Costs 
A different set of objections to Withdrawing concerns transition costs. 
The basic argument is that, even assuming that the Default View is in 
theory superior to the status quo, the costs of moving to it might be too 
high and the benefits too small. 
In Withdrawing, we considered in detail the costs associated with the 
Mandatory View and the benefits of allowing some unilateral exit from 
rules of CIL. We explained, for example, that an across-the-board denial of 
exit is likely to make CIL unduly sticky and inefficient and vulnerable to 
holdout problems. We also explained how a shift to the Default View 
would likely increase innovation and experimentation in the development 
of international law because the cost of developing new CIL rules would be 
lessened and states that invoked the exit option would have an incentive to 
articulate alternative rules. Furthermore, we explained how an exit option is 
likely to facilitate the enforcement of international law, both by making 
CIL rules clearer and by making violations of CIL rules (as opposed to 
withdrawals) a more reliable indicator of bad state behavior. Finally, we 
explained that, in light of the substantial overlap that exists today between 
the substantive content of CIL and treaties, a shift to a Default View would 
likely increase treatymaking, since nations would no longer need to worry 
that establishing a treaty would create CIL that would lack an exit option.52 
Some of our respondents nevertheless suggest that the benefits of a 
shift to the Default View will be small. There are two versions of this 
“small benefits” argument. The first is that the Mandatory View, while the 
officially articulated position regarding CIL exit rights, is honored more in 
the breach. The claim is that the current system of CIL is so amorphous and 
uncertain that nations can stay within the system and still, via arguments 
about exceptions or what the relevant rule really requires, exit or alter rules 
that they dislike.53 As a result, the argument goes, any benefits from a 
Default View are already being achieved through de facto exit mechanisms. 
 
 52. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 245, 250, 259-60, 262-63. 
 53. See, e.g., Estreicher, supra note 17, at 59; Lim & Elias, supra note 19, at 151-52; Swaine, 
supra note 22, at 215. 
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As we explained in Withdrawing, even if this de facto exit argument 
were correct, there are still benefits to shifting from a system of de facto 
exit to de jure exit.54 Among other things, a system of de jure exit is more 
consonant with rule of law values than a system of de facto exit and 
thereby has the potential to enhance CIL’s legitimacy. A de jure exit 
system would also enhance the availability of information because exits 
would be express and public, whereas nations are likely to attempt to 
conceal information in a system of de facto exits. More information in turn 
would make it easier for nations to make appropriate adjustments in their 
international relationships. 
In any event, a system in which a nation’s ability to exit is a function 
of it making arguments to manipulate the extant vague rule is unlikely to 
benefit all nations equally. As with any manipulable legal system, the 
higher the degree of manipulability, the bigger the advantage for those who 
have better lawyers and greater control over the legal institutions. They are 
not only better situated to create exit opportunities for themselves, but also 
to block the exit of their weaker counterparts. In effect, we end up with a 
system that operates as more of a default system for the rich and powerful 
nations and more of a mandatory system for the others. A formal shift to 
acknowledging the Default View would put the differently situated nations 
on more of an even footing. 
Even for powerful nations, however, the vagueness and manipulability 
of CIL will not always provide a feasible exit mechanism. A nation 
attempting to persuade others of a previously unknown CIL rule or an 
exception to an existing CIL rule must still marshal evidence of state 
practice and opinio juris. While there is undoubtedly extensive room to 
argue about the implications of historical materials, the very vagueness and 
manipulability of the materials also allows others to contest these 
arguments, using the same kinds of techniques. Moreover, there remain 
limits to what can be found in historical evidence, and sometimes there 
simply will not be any such evidence to invoke in support of a new rule or 
an exception to the old rule.55 In any event, as discussed below in Section 
C, powerful nations would derive benefits from a shift to the Default View 
even if their own exit ability were not enhanced. 
 
 54. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 262. 
 55. The modern proponents of a doctrine of Odious Debts, which would expand the set of 
exceptions to the strict rule of governmental successor liability for state debts, found exactly that in 
their attempts to construct a historical case for their doctrine out of the writings of a Russian jurist, 
Alexander Sack. See Sarah Ludington & Mitu Gulati, A Convenient Untruth, Fact and Fantasy in the 
Doctrine of Odious Debt, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 595 (2008); Sarah Ludington et al., Applied Legal History: 
Demystifying the Doctrine of Odious Debt, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L., 247, 249-50 (2010). 
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A different version of the small benefits argument infers from the fact 
that no one (apart from the two of us, and perhaps also Andrew Guzman) 
appears to be complaining about the current system that the current system 
cannot be all that bad.56 This is a Chicago School-type efficient markets 
argument: if the current system were really inefficient, there would be more 
actors clamoring to alter it. The flaw in this argument is that, even if the 
Mandatory View were sub-optimal, there are a multitude of reasons why it 
might not be challenged. There is a literature on the stickiness of standards 
in the context of private contracts, and the basic question that is asked there 
is why sophisticated actors (including nations) often adhere to suboptimal 
standards even though the system as a whole would be better off with a 
shift to a new standard.57 Among the reasons for this divergence between 
individual incentives and social incentives can be first-mover costs, loss 
aversion, status quo biases, network externalities, and negative signals.58 
Many of these same factors are likely relevant to the secondary rules of 
CIL. 
In any event, developing countries have in fact long complained about 
aspects of the Mandatory View, as we discussed in Withdrawing.59 While it 
is true that powerful Western countries have not explicitly challenged the 
Mandatory View, this is probably due in part to the fact that they have the 
resources to work around some of the inefficiencies that it creates. It is also 
unrealistic to expect foreign ministries, even in the most developed 
countries, to operate at the level of legal theory, as opposed to arguing 
about specific outcomes. While one should expect legal scholars to operate 
at this level, there has been a widespread assumption in the academy that 
the current mandatory system has always been in place, an assumption that 
makes it less likely that there will be challenges. One driving force for our 
writing Withdrawing was the finding that the Mandatory View might not 
have had the long historical pedigree that it is implicitly assumed to have, 
and that its adoption in the literature may have rested on normatively 
unattractive premises. Furthermore, as explained above in Part I, there is 
hardly contentment in the legal academy with the currently prevailing 
conception of CIL. Indeed, this conception is increasingly being challenged 
 
 56. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 188-89. 
 57. As Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow explain: “It is by now recognized that factors beyond 
drafting costs might also cause parties to stick with an undesirable default rule; that is, parties might 
choose not to opt out of a legal default even when a better provision can easily be identified and 
articulated at a negligible drafting cost.” Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of 
Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 651 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 58. See id. at 652-60. 
 59. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 230. 
BRADLEY_GULATI_FMT3.DOC 1/7/2011  1:31:36 PM 
2010] CIL AND WITHDRAWAL IN THE AGE OF TREATIES 19 
on a variety of fronts, and new questions are being raised about the role of 
CIL in a world of multilateral treatymaking. 
A different cost-benefit critique of our proposal concerns the costs of 
shifting from the Mandatory View to the Default View. One version of this 
critique is that the transition process will involve a period of uncertainty 
during which some nations might act opportunistically—for example, by 
exiting when they ordinarily would not be permitted to do so even under a 
fully-developed Default View.60 A second version is that misbehaving 
nations might take advantage of the period of uncertainty to shape the 
Default View in a fashion that allows them to act even more 
opportunistically in the future—perhaps by adopting a version of the 
Default View that does not contain the various limitations that we suggest. 
In considering these arguments, it is important to bear in mind that the 
current system does not appear to be operating at a level of clarity and 
certainty. Moreover, as we have explained, the possibility of exit is likely 
to enhance clarity, since nations would have to explain what they were 
opting out of (and, likely, what they were opting into), and the threat of exit 
could also give nations additional incentives to create treaties to settle 
contested issues.61 
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the process of shifting to 
a new standard would inject additional uncertainty into the system, the 
question to ask is which nations are likely to take advantage of this 
uncertainty to exit. The more powerful nations presumably are the most 
comfortable with the general corpus of existing CIL, since they have had 
predominant influence over its creation. Perhaps, however, our respondents 
are imagining a different set of nations, nations that are not influential 
within the international system and are looking for opportunities to exit 
their legal obligations so as to be able to impose externalities on neighbors 
or harm their own people. The question is not whether these rogue nations 
might misbehave—they presumably already do that under the current 
system. Rather, the issue is whether the possibility of formal exit from CIL 
rules will encourage additional misbehavior. As explained in Withdrawing, 
we think this is unlikely, since these actors are the least likely to want to 
articulate their position and absorb the reputational and reciprocity 
consequences associated with that position.62 
Another concern expressed by some of our respondents is that the type 
of Default View that finally gets adopted will not be the one with the 
 
 60. See Roberts, supra note 29, at 185. 
 61. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 271-72. 
 62. See id. at 260-61. 
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various limitations that we have suggested, such as notice requirements to 
protect reliance interests, and restrictions on exit for CIL rules addressing 
significant agency and externality problems. This concern, however, 
suggests that the actors with the most influence on the development of the 
CIL system will favor unrestricted exit rights, which seems highly unlikely. 
If anything, the richer and more powerful nations, which will have the most 
influence on any shift of the CIL system, are more concerned about 
reliance interests, externalities, and agency problems than their less 
developed brethren. Moreover, as CIL has changed in the past, it has 
developed limitations to restrain state misbehavior, and there is no reason 
to think that this will not be true of future changes to CIL, including 
potentially a shift to the Default View. 
The possible limitations we discussed in Withdrawing would likely 
address many of the concerns that have been expressed about the costs of 
implementation. One of our respondents expresses the concern, for 
example, that an opt out right from CIL could destabilize existing treaties 
because nations might claim new CIL interpretive views vis-à-vis the 
treaties they previously entered into (for example, about whether treaties 
are binding on sub-national governments).63 It is likely, however, that an 
adjudicator would hold the parties to their mutual understanding at the time 
of ratification, not after the fact. Consistent with that idea, the Default 
View that we have proposed (and which was articulated by a number of 
nineteenth century commentators) would operate only prospectively. In any 
event, states will have a strong incentive not to withdraw from the usual 
rules of CIL of treaty interpretation, even prospectively, because doing so 
would raise the cost of entering into new treaties. 
C. Feasibility 
The next set of objections concerns feasibility or practicality. Even if 
the Default View is superior to the Mandatory View, it is claimed, certain 
structural features of the current system will render a shift infeasible. The 
first objection is that even if it is clear that the Default View is superior to 
the Mandatory View, powerful nations within the system have incentives to 
block such a move.64 The second objection is that the creation process for 
CIL is so amorphous that it does not lend itself to tailored exit rules for 
different types of CIL.65 
 
 63. Brewster, supra note 5, at 50-51. 
 64. Estreicher, supra note 17, at 58-59. 
 65. Id. at 59. 
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The most potent objection against the Default View is a pragmatic one 
concerning incentives. If the Mandatory View benefits the strong states 
more than the weaker states (or at least disadvantages them less), as it 
probably does, then efforts to shift to a Default View may be doomed to 
failure. What little we know about the processes by which international 
standards and norms shift suggests that certain key states—often big 
players with the most at stake—need to take the lead in inducing the shift.66 
To be sure, powerful states should have an incentive to take the lead in 
improving the CIL system, since they typically have the largest number of 
interstate relationships and therefore the most to gain from improvements 
in the legal system that governs those relationships. But in a suboptimal 
system that allows the powerful states to derive excess gains from 
opportunistic behavior at the expense of the smaller and weaker states, 
these powerful states may decide not to invest resources in producing a 
shift toward a better standard. In the worst case scenario, the powerful 
states may even use resources to block any attempted shift by the other 
nations. 
While this is a significant objection, it probably had more validity 
when CIL was inductively derived from longstanding state practice, 
because powerful states have greater opportunity to create and influence 
this practice. As we discussed in Withdrawing, however, there have been 
increasing efforts to base CIL on the declarations of international bodies, 
where the weaker countries have more voice, and on treaties that might not 
have been ratified by all the powerful nations.67 These changes in the way 
that CIL is understood, which are still very much in a state of flux, may 
mean that powerful nations will increasingly have more to gain from a shift 
in approach to CIL, or at least that these nations may have less reason to 
resist a shift. 
In any event, we acknowledge that it may be difficult to move to a 
better system if we simply wait for the current system to evolve over time. 
From a Coasean bargaining perspective, though, this is a familiar problem. 
When the total social gains from a shift to a new system are significant and 
positive, the solution is to find a mechanism that will reduce transaction 
costs and enable the different sides to come together to figure out a new 
way to share the gains from an improved system (since, left to their own 
devices, they may not evolve towards this new system). Once again, the 
 
 66. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts, 53 EMORY L.J. 
929 (2004) (describing Mexico’s leadership in leading a shift in international contractual standards); 
Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INDUS. 
ORG. 887, 901 (1998). 
 67. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 213. 
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treaty analogy can help here. A treatymaking process similar to the one that 
was used to address secondary rules relating to treaties (which resulted in 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) could be used to address 
the secondary rules of CIL, including withdrawal rights. This process 
would both help solve the coordination and bargaining problems, and also 
go a long way towards reducing any negative signal that might be 
associated with an effort to relax the Mandatory View. 
A different pragmatic objection is that the structure of CIL simply 
does not allow for the kind of tailoring of CIL exit rules that we suggest at 
the conclusion of Withdrawing.68 In other words, it is not clear how the 
vague evolutionary process of CIL generation can produce exit rules that 
discriminate between those situations in which the Mandatory View is 
appropriate and those situations in which the Default View is appropriate. 
This argument appears to be overstated in that current CIL theory 
already has some variation in exit rights—most notably between ordinary 
CIL, which allows for persistent objection and treaty override, and jus 
cogens norms, which do not.69 In addition, other areas of CIL have 
developed variegated limitations on state behavior that are thought to be 
meaningful, including limitations on rights of exit. Consider, for example, 
the CIL of countermeasures. Under certain circumstances, states are 
permitted to take measures that would otherwise violate international law 
as a countermeasure in response to another state’s breach.70 In other words, 
the law of countermeasures allows states to temporarily exit from their 
international obligations vis-à-vis particular breaching states. There are 
restrictions, however, on this exit right. For example, as a matter of CIL, 
countermeasures are not allowed if they would violate international 
restrictions on the use or threat of force or if they would undermine 
fundamental human rights protections, and they must be proportional to the 
injury suffered.71 If CIL can develop restrictions like these, it is not clear 
why it cannot develop similar restrictions on exit rights under a Default 
View of CIL. 
 
 68. See, e.g., Trachtman, supra note 7. 
 69. See, e.g., Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 291, 
298-301 (2006); Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Jus Cogens 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 
336-37 (2009). 
 70. See INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION, ARTICLES ON RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR 
INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACTS, arts. 4-11 (James Crawford, ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2002). 
 71. See id. at arts. 50, 51. Other areas of CIL similarly have uncodified limitations designed to 
ensure that nations act reasonably. For example, the CIL governing the use of defensive military force 
requires that the use of force be both necessary and proportional. 
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In any event, it is possible that not much tailoring would be needed in 
order to move to a Default View. There could be a regime, for example, in 
which exit would be allowed unless it would undermine reliance interests 
or impose substantial externalities.72 Alternatively, given the substantial 
overlap that now exists between CIL and treaties, one could imagine CIL 
exit rights that would largely track the exit rights under the corresponding 
treaties.73 Reasonableness requirements that are thought already to exist 
under CIL could also play a useful role.74 
IV. WILL IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?  
A final objection to our project is that allowing for withdrawal rights 
under CIL will make no difference in state behavior and thus is not worth 
even a modest cost of transition. Even if nations formally have a right to 
exit from CIL rules, the argument goes, they will not utilize this right and 
will instead do what they already do: argue about the content of CIL, 
engage in surreptitious violations, and the like.75 Commentators who raise 
this objection point to the experience with the persistent objector doctrine, 
which is almost never invoked.76 They also note that withdrawing from a 
rule of CIL will be costly for a state because it requires a public 
acknowledgement that the state is an outlier.77 
 The underutilization argument is in obvious tension with arguments 
by some of our other respondents, who fear that a shift to the Default View 
will be too effective and thus will create uncertainty and opportunism and 
prompt an excessive number of withdrawals from CIL rules.78 In any event, 
the lack of use of the persistent objector doctrine is likely explained by 
structural features that would not exist for subsequent exit rights. 
Moreover, experience with a variety of exit rights under treaties suggests 
that, although nations are not likely to invoke CIL exit rights with great 
 
 72. Trachtman appears to agree with us that exit rights would be appropriate in the absence of 
reliance or externality problems, although he questions whether international law is needed in those 
situations. See Trachtman, supra note 7, at 231. 
 73. See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Custom: Analogies to Treaty Withdrawals, 21 DUKE J. COMP. 
& INT’L L. 65 (2010). 
 74. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.J. 392, 420 (Nov. 26) (disallowing withdrawal from jurisdiction because notice was given only a 
few days before the case was brought). 
 75. See Estreicher, supra note 17, at 61-62. 
 76. Id. at 61 (citing sources making this point); see also Dumberry, supra note 9, at 381 (noting 
that “there is no actual state practice supporting” the persistent objector doctrine). 
 77. See Estreicher, supra note 17; see also Dumberry, supra note 9, at 388 (making the point that 
the persistent objector doctrine is not used very often because its use would show a “state’s isolation 
from the rest of the international community”). 
 78. See Ochoa, supra note 40; Roberts, supra note 29. 
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frequency, there will be situations in which they will find that the benefits 
of doing so will outweigh the costs. In addition, there are a number of 
reasons to believe that an increased availability of exit from CIL will 
improve the quality of CIL and help revitalize this body of international 
law. 
A. Persistent Objector Doctrine 
While it is true that nations have made little use of the persistent 
objector doctrine, this is probably due to several structural limitations that 
are built into the doctrine. First, to successfully invoke the doctrine, a 
nation must object to the CIL rule before it forms. The process of CIL 
formation is highly uncertain, however, so a nation is unlikely to know 
precisely when a custom has evolved into a binding norm. Moreover, a 
nation might not have any interest in the issue covered by the CIL rule until 
after a binding norm is formed, and yet by that point, according to the 
Mandatory View, it is too late to object. Second, a nation must repeatedly 
and prominently object to the rule on the international stage.79 This means 
that, instead of engaging in quiet diplomacy, the nation must self-
consciously generate a substantial amount of friction with the nations that 
are seeking to solidify the custom, and this friction is likely to be costly in 
terms of possible retaliation and loss of opportunities for cooperation. 
Third, given the inevitable uncertainty over whether a particular CIL rule 
has formed, a nation that does not wish to be bound by such a rule might 
not wish to object to it, let alone do so repeatedly and prominently, for fear 
that such objections will be used by others as evidence that the rule already 
exists, which, in turn, could produce the argument that the objecting nation 
is bound. 
These structural limitations are all removed under the Default View. A 
nation would not need to know precisely when the CIL rule had formed, 
since it could opt out, with adequate notice, even after the rule formed. Nor 
would there be a requirement of repeated and continued objection. A single 
clear objection would suffice, diminishing the amount of friction that has to 
be created. And a nation desiring exit would not need to be concerned that 
by announcing its desire to exit, it was inadvertently helping to create a rule 
that others might then argue that it was restricted from leaving. 
One might still ask why a nation would invoke subsequent opt out 
rights when doing so reveals that this nation is an outlier on a particular 
issue. While providing this information can entail a cost, such a cost is 
likely to be lower in at least some instances than the cost of either violating 
 
 79. MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 14 (1985). 
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the CIL rule or continuing to acquiesce in it. For example, if a nation is 
relatively weak and violations of the rule are easily detected, exit from a 
suboptimal CIL rule may be a more attractive option than a breach.80 
Moreover, the cost of being an outlier will vary depending on the particular 
issue area and the extent to which the nation has a reputation for 
opportunism. A nation can also take a variety of steps to reduce the 
reputational cost of exit, such as enacting domestic legislation that ties its 
hands in a way that demonstrates that it is not exiting for opportunistic 
reasons, or proposing and unilaterally following a superior alternative to 
the CIL rule. That is one reason, as we explained in Withdrawing, why 
“good” states are more likely to use the exit option than “bad” states.81 
Importantly, experience with a variety of exit rights under treaties 
shows that states often provide this sort of outlier information even when it 
might seem contrary to their interests to do so. Nations have invoked treaty 
withdrawal clauses in an appreciable number of instances, even though 
such invocation is a highly public act.82 They also have frequently invoked 
derogation clauses in human rights treaties, even though this requires 
providing information about their deviations and exposing themselves to 
scrutiny and criticism.83 Similarly, nations often have attached reservations 
to their ratification of treaties, even though this, too, has an information-
forcing effect.84 
 
 80. A possible example would be exit from the CIL rule of strict governmental succession to debt 
obligations, including debts that are “odious.” Cf. Ludington et al., supra note 55. To avoid reliance 
problems, a nation would presumably need to announce the exit prior to incurring the debt obligation. 
In that situation, creditors, recognizing a new risk, would likely demand that the borrower provide 
credible assurances that it was not incurring odious debt. A “good” government might be able to 
provide such assurances by harnessing external monitors—either international organizations such as the 
World Bank or the IMF, or NGOs like Transparency International—which could certify the character of 
the government and its use of proceeds. In effect, the opt-out mechanism might allow the governments 
of countries that previously had weak democratic institutions to both credibly signal their intentions to 
behave well and to harness external forces to police those intentions. For discussion of how ex ante or 
continuing certification might work, see, for example, Seema Jayachandran & Michael Kremer, Odious 
Debt, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 82 (2006), and Omri Ben-Shahar & Mitu Gulati, Partially Odious Debts, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 73-75 (2007). 
 81. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 260. Allowing lawful exit as an alternative to 
surreptitious violation may also increase the likelihood that nations will be socialized towards law 
compliance. Cf. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 667-69 (2004) (discussing this possibility in 
connection with derogation clauses in human rights treaties). 
 82. See Helfer, supra note 73, at 69-70. 
 83. See Emile Hafner-Burton, Laurence R. Helfer, and Christopher J. Fariss, Emergency and 
Escape: Explaining Why States Derogate from Human Rights Treaties During National Emergencies, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=1622732. 
 84. See Edward T. Swaine, Reserving, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 335-38 (2006).  
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B. Revitalizing CIL 
Not only will subsequent opt out rights be used more often than the 
persistent objector doctrine, such rights will also better serve one of the 
central purposes of the persistent objector doctrine. As explained 
in Withdrawing, the persistent objector doctrine was adopted in part to 
facilitate the creation of CIL.85 There had been a concern in the post-World 
War II era that CIL rules might not be able to develop if one or a small 
number of nations objected. The persistent objector doctrine was viewed as 
helping the international system avoid this veto problem, by allowing CIL 
to develop in the face of objection.86 Because of the way it is structured, 
however, the persistent objector doctrine is almost a nullity in international 
law.  
As Estreicher notes, allowing subsequent opt out rights, by contrast, is 
likely to facilitate the creation of CIL.87 Such opt out rights provide nations 
with a form of insurance, in case they find after supporting a rule of CIL 
that it does not serve their interests.88 This insurance is likely to make 
nations more willing to support new developments in CIL. This helps 
explain why withdrawal clauses are so common in treaties—they facilitate 
treatymaking by providing a form of insurance. To take one example, 
consider efforts to abolish the death penalty through CIL. Nations that are 
uncertain about whether it is in their interest to shift away from the current 
CIL rule allowing capital punishment may not want to support a change in 
this rule of CIL because, once the new CIL rule forms, they will be unable 
to exit from it. Such a nation might reasonably be concerned that if their 
public later demanded the death penalty, or they came to the conclusion 
that they needed it for criminal deterrence, their options would be unduly 
restricted. If they knew in advance that they could later withdraw from the 
CIL rule, however, these concerns would be reduced, making them more 
likely to support the change in the CIL rule. Implicitly, the United Nations 
has recognized this possibility when it has supported resolutions calling on 
nations to adhere to a moratorium on the death penalty, a step that would be 
 
 85. Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 233. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Estreicher views this potential increase in the volume of CIL as a flaw in the Default View, 
but his concern appears to reflect some general hostility to CIL. By contrast, we see the Default View as 
a means of revitalizing CIL, a source of international law that has increasingly become the subject of 
criticism for its incoherence, inefficiency, and lack of utility for addressing modern problems. 
 88. See, e.g., Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in International Law at 8 
(Oct. 2009) (draft), http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1006&context=timothy 
_meyer; Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1599-1601 (2005); Alan O. Sykes, 
Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive Analysis of the GATT ”Escape Clause” with Normative 
Speculations, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1991). 
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reversible if a nation later decided to re-impose that form of punishment.89 
It is only the Mandatory View that seems oblivious to the ex ante effects of 
disallowing withdrawal.  
Allowing subsequent exit rights will also likely improve the quality of 
CIL. As we explained in Withdrawing, the option to exit can serve as an 
effective signaling device for nations seeking to communicate with each 
other about the need to reform existing laws.90 By contrast, the current 
system under the Mandatory View does not provide for effective signaling. 
Signals work best when they can send a clear and reliable message about 
some underlying complex reality and they are credible in that they would 
be too costly to send if the underlying message was not real.91 As 
Estreicher notes, however, the current system facilitates a body of vague 
and amorphous CIL that allows nations to purport to stay within the system 
(that is, face little risk of being called a law violator) while arguing about 
what the CIL rule really requires.92 In such a system, nations engage in a 
form of cheap talk, or what Estreicher calls “law-speak.” Cheap talk is a 
form of communication, but not a very effective type because the talk is 
neither clear nor credible. 
The Default View also has the potential to improve the substantive 
content of CIL rules. Under the Default View, a nation would have the 
opportunity to evaluate the operation of the rule for some period of time 
before deciding whether to continue to be bound by the rule or whether to 
exit and perhaps propose an alternative rule. This possibility of opting out 
after the rule has formed will increase the opportunities for exit, thereby 
increasing the utilization rate of the exit option under the Default View. As 
Guzman recognizes in his proposal to reform the persistent objector 
doctrine, many nations might not have a significant interest in a CIL rule 
when it is forming, but may develop such an interest later.93 Under the 
Default view, these nations, which previously had little ability to object to a 
 
 89. See Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Adopts Landmark Text Calling for 
Moratorium on Death Penalty, U.N. Press Release GA/10678 (Dec. 18, 2007). 
 90. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 260; see also Meyer, supra note 88, at 17 (making the 
point, in the treaty exit context, that the use of the exit option can send a credible signal that the exiting 
nation is serious about the need to renegotiate the existing regime). 
 91. On the question of what kinds of communications work as effective signals, see Patrick Shin 
& Mitu Gulati, Showcasing Diversity, 89 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011). For a general discussion of 
signaling, see ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 18-27 (2000). 
 92. See Estreicher, supra note 17, at 59. 
 93. Recognizing this limitation in the persistent objector doctrine, Guzman has suggested that 
nations should be allowed to exit from CIL rules after they form. However, his proposal would allow 
exit only when the nation first develops an interest in the issue. The problem with this approach is that it 
does not allow for the possibility that the interests of nations can change beyond the initial development 
of an interest. See Guzman, supra note 14, at 169-71. 
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rule, will now be able to do so. Further, because nations will likely exit at 
the points in time when their interests are implicated (as opposed to when 
the law forms), the quality of their reasons for exiting will be higher. That, 
in turn, should help produce higher quality alternative rules for nations to 
exit to. To be sure, allowing exit rights would not eliminate all of the 
conceptual and practical difficulties associated with modern CIL, but it 
would at least create the possibility of incremental improvement to this 
important body of international law. 
V. FURTHER RESEARCH 
Our respondents raise a number of good questions with respect to the 
arguments in Withdrawing. Where possible, we have attempted to answer 
those questions. Nevertheless, there remain a variety of gaps in our 
knowledge, and any effort to improve the secondary rules of CIL would 
benefit from additional research that addresses those gaps. In this final 
section, we identify some of the potential research projects that could 
advance our understanding of exit from CIL. 
First, while we believe we have come close to estimating when the 
shift to the Mandatory View occurred in the literature, we still have not 
pinpointed this development precisely. If this could be done, it might 
improve our analysis of why the shift occurred. We hypothesized that the 
shift to the Mandatory View had to do with the changing balance in power 
between the Western powers and the newly independent states. However, 
the historical evidence we cited in support of this hypothesis in 
Withdrawing was limited. 
Second, our unearthing of an original Default View for at least some 
rules of CIL is largely derived from the writings of scholars such as 
Vattel.94 We have relatively little concrete evidence of state practice at the 
time, let alone its evolution over time.95 Similarly, we have relatively little 
information concerning modern state practice under the Mandatory View. 
Among other things, it would be useful to know whether and to what extent 
there has been a disjunction over the years between the actual practices of 
nations with respect to exit and the articulations of the Default or 
Mandatory views in the treatises. 
Third, even our review of the scholarly record only scratched the 
surface. Most of the scholarly writing we considered after the eighteenth 
century was from the United States and Great Britain, and it would be 
 
 94. See Swaine, supra note 22. 
 95. The need for more evidence of actual state practice is emphasized by Lim & Elias, supra note 
19. 
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useful to know more about the views of continental European scholars 
about exit rights under CIL. It would also be useful to understand in more 
detail the connections between the “voluntarist” school of international 
law, which was popular in the early to mid-twentieth century, and both the 
Default and Mandatory Views.96 
Fourth, although we explored in detail the development of the 
persistent objector doctrine, we did not study other developments in CIL 
doctrine in the twentieth century, such as the increased emphasis on the 
opinio juris requirement and the jus cogens category. It is quite possible 
that a study of these and other modern developments would yield additional 
insights about the shift from the Default View to the Mandatory View and 
about how the Mandatory View has operated in practice. 
Fifth, while Larry Helfer’s work on exit rights under treaties has been 
an invaluable source of insights,97 more work in that area is needed. As 
mentioned in Withdrawing, we know relatively little about the design and 
use of exit clauses in different types of treaties and how patterns may have 
evolved over time.98 We also know little about the conditions under which 
exit rights are invoked and the characteristics of the nations involved. It 
would be useful to have this empirical information in thinking about how to 
design exit rights under CIL. 
Finally, although we considered a variety of theoretical arguments 
relating to the efficiency of CIL under the Mandatory View, we did not 
analyze the efficiency of specific CIL rules.99 We believe our assumptions 
about how CIL works are reasonable for purposes of the arguments we 
make, but it would be useful to have a detailed analysis of CIL in at least a 
handful of areas that considers whether the relevant customary rules in 
those areas work optimally. The area of environmental law, for example, 
strikes us particularly likely to yield insights, given that the external 
conditions have changed so rapidly in that area. It would also be useful to 
study whether inefficient CIL rules are indeed sticky, as we suggest they 
are likely to be. 
CONCLUSION 
The Mandatory View of CIL, by disallowing unilateral exit under all 
circumstances, stands in stark contrast to the approach that nations have 
 
 96. See Bradley & Gulati, supra note 1, at 228. 
 97. See Helfer, supra note 88. 
 98. For some helpful recent work relating to the design of exit clauses, see Barbara Koremenos & 
Allison Nau, Exit, No Exit, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 81 (2010). 
 99. See Brewster, supra note 5. 
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followed when negotiating treaties, even though CIL and treaties frequently 
overlap and treaties are often the principal evidence cited in support of CIL. 
The categorical disallowance of exit under the Mandatory View is also 
anomalous when considered from the perspective of scholarship on exit 
rights in areas such as contract law, constitutional design, and voting rights. 
Despite these anomalies, the international law academy has taken the 
Mandatory View for granted, perhaps because of a mistaken historical 
assumption that unilateral exit has always been disallowed for CIL. This is 
a particularly appropriate time for a reexamination of the Mandatory View, 
as CIL has come under increasing challenge on a variety of fronts and 
multilateral treatymaking has displaced some of the traditional functions of 
CIL. We hope to have contributed to that reexamination both in our initial 
article and in this symposium. 
 
